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COMMENTS 
DAMAGES-PAIN AND SUFFERING-USE OF A MATHEMATICAL 
FoRMULA:-Measurement of damages for pain and suffering is, in 
a sense, an attempt to measure the unmeasurable; yet as long as 
our law recognizes a right to recover for pain and suffering, the 
jury or judge must arrive at some concrete figure. The traditional 
approach of simply instructing the jury that they should arrive at 
a reasonable amount provides little, if any, guidance. The question 
is whether this approach, nevertheless, remains the best of a bad 
lot of alternatives. If more guidance is desirable, what can be 
accomplished within the framework of our present system? The 
mathematical formula discussed in this comment presents one 
possibility. 
Prior to the past decade, scant attention had been given to the 
subject of personal injury damages generally,1 and to the use of the 
formula approach specifically. In fact, use of the formula approach 
had been considered by the highest court of just one state, Penn-
sylvania, and there only tangentially.2 In recent years, however, 
the propriety of the formula approach to damages for pain and 
suffering has received the attention of a growing number of courts, 
both state and federal.3 The question has arisen in two basic 
situations.4 The first is the use by counsel of a formula in his 
argument to the jury. This can involve either a statement by 
counsel of his beliefs as to the value of pain and suffering per hour 
or per day, coupled with the suggestion that this figure be used in 
a formula for calculating the damages to be awarded;15 or it can 
1 Wright, Damages for Personal Injuries-Foreword, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 155 (1958). 
Wright lists the following reasons for the lack of a well-developed law of damages for 
personal injuries: it did not make much difference because of the many bars to liability 
and the small verdicts; judicial review on the damage issue was extremely limited; and 
there existed a feeling that awards of damages for personal injuries were essentially 
irrational. He points out, however, that there have been drastic changes in this area 
since World War II. Wright, supra, at 156. 
2 See cases cited notes 32-43 infra and accompanying text. See also 41 B.U.L. REv. 432 
(1961). 
3 See 41 B.U.L. REv. 432 (1961). 
4 See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1331, 1347 (1958). This annotation suggests a further ques• 
tion: What may the trial judge say in his instructions to the jury as to the use of the 
formula approach? Discussion of this question is omitted herein, because it has not been 
a factor in recent cases and because it is so intimately connected with the questions 
discussed. 
5 For example: Five dollars per day for plaintiff's life expectancy of 13,920 days or 
$69,600. The use of a per diem formula will be discussed herein, although what is said 
applies equally to a per mensum or any other formula approach. 
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involve merely a suggestion by counsel, without an expression of 
his personal opinion as to value, that the jury base their evaluation 
on some per diem figure in conjunction with a formula.6 The other 
situation in which the propriety of the formula approach arises is 
actual use by the jury, or by the judge if he is the assessor of 
damages in the particular case. 7 
I. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT: CONFLICT AND CONFUSION 
It should be emphasized that the courts are running the 
complete gamut in degree of tolerance of the formula approach. 
As of the present time, the use by counsel of a per diem formula 
has been approved in five states: 8 Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, 
Utah, and Washington. It has been approved by intermediate 
courts in five additional states;9 Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Mary-
land and Texas. On the federal level, the Sixth and Third Circuits 
have added their approval.1° Minnesota and one federal district 
court have approved counsel's use of the formula for "illustrative 
purposes."11 North Dakota permits counsel to suggest that the 
jury make use of the formula approach.12 Four states,13 New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Wisconsin and the 
Second Circuit14 permit mention of the ad damnum clause or some 
total figure. The positions of four other states and one federal 
6 King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961). See Botta v. 
Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). 
7 Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956) 
(use of a formula by a federal judge). 
8 Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961); Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n 
v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954); Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 
754 (1959); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P .2d 575 (1960); 
Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960). 
9 Ratner v. Arrington, Ill So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Caley v. Manicke, 29 
Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961); Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W .2d 155 
(Ky. 1960); Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Corbett, 177 A.2d 701 (Md. 1962); Texas &: 
N.O.R.R. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). 
10 Pennsylvania R.R. v. McKinley, 288 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1961); Bowers v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 281 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1960), affirming 182 F. Supp. 756 (D. Del. 1960). 
11 Wuth v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va. 1958); Boutang v. Twin City 
Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1956). 
12 King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961). 
13 Kinnear v. General Mills, Inc., 308 Mass. 344, 32 N.E.2d 263 (1941); Dean v. Wabash 
R.R., 229 Mo. 425, 129 S.W. 953 (1910); Sanders v. Boston &: Me. R.R., 77 N.H. 381, 92 
Atl. 546 (1914); Affelt v. Milwaukee &: Suburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 
N.W.2d 274 (1960). 
14 Philadelphia &: R. Ry. v. Sherman, 247 F. 269 (2d Cir. 1917). 
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circuit are not clear, but it seems that all of them at least approve 
mention of a total figure.15 
Eight states,16 Delaware, Missouri, North Dakota, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin clearly 
prohibit counsel from using a formula approach. The Eighth 
Circuit has also indicated disapproval,17 and Connecticut prohibits 
mention of the ad damnum clause.18 The other state and federal 
courts, seemingly, have not yet passed on this question. 
A. "Illustrative Purposes" 
It will generally be the case that courts which allow counsel to 
use a formula will not reverse a verdict simply because the jury 
apparently used a similar approach. Likewise, one would expect 
a court which prohibits the use of a formula by counsel to apply 
the same prohibition to use by the jury. 
Nevertheless, at least two courts limit use of a formula to 
counsel by making it theoretically impossible for the jury to use 
the formula.19 This is perhaps best termed the "Minnesota doc-
trine" because of the prominence it has attained in the courts of 
that state. Early Minnesota decisions commented that the formula 
approach, though "illuminating," may be "misleading."20 In 
Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co.,21 however, the Minnesota 
court noted that none of the previous cases had held that a formula 
could not be used for purely "illustrative" purposes.22 This means 
15 Haycock v. Christie, 249 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1957); McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 
588, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958); Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 161 (1961); Kindler v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App. 261, 130 N.E.2d 491 (1955); Haley 
v. Hockey, 199 Misc. 512, 103 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1950). 
16 Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 
588 (Mo. 1959); King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961); Botta 
v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Bostwick v. Pittsburgh Rys., 255 Pa. 387, 
100 Atl. 123 (1917); Harper v. Bolton, 123 S.E.2d 54 (S.C. 1962); Certified T.V. &: Appliance 
Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959). An Ohio court has disapproved of 
the formula approach but held that the use of a formula did not lead to prejudicial 
results in the particular case. Hall v. Booth, 178 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961). 
17 Chicago &: N.W. Ry. v. Candler, 283 Fed. 881 (8th Cir. 1922). 
18 Cooley v. Crispino, 147 A.2d 497 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958). 
19 Wuth v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va. 1958); Boutang v. Twin City 
Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1956). 
20 Hallada v. Great No. Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 874 
(1955); Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis St. P. &: S. Ste. M.R.R., 244 Minn. I, 68 N.W.2d 873 
(1955). 
21 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1956). 
22 Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., supra note 21, at 250-51, 80 N.W.2d at 39; 
accord, Flaherty v. Minneapolis&: St. L. Ry., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W.2d 633 (1958). 
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that a formula can be used by counsel in his argument but it 
cannot be used by the jury to test the reasonableness of the final 
damage figure. This result ignores the bases of the early decisions 
which attack formulas as being generally intolerable. Furthermore, 
it is unrealistic; because once a figure is before the jurors, they can 
be unduly influenced by it without using the formula approach 
themselves. If the earlier criticisms were valid and if there is a 
fear that the jury will be misled, logically the use of a formula 
should not be permitted for "illustrative" or any other purposes. 
On the other hand, if there is confidence in the jury, in the 
discretion of the trial judge, and in the ability of a court of review 
to prevent intolerable results, the use of a formula should not be 
restricted to counsel. 
The position of the North Dakota court23 is even less under-
standable. It would permit counsel to suggest that the jury adopt 
a per diem formula approach but prohibit counsel himself from 
spelling out the details of such an approach with specific figures. 
This court clearly is worried only that the jury will accept the 
suggestion of counsel as an established fact. Yet, if the jury itself 
can safely use the formula approach, it should certainly be able to 
gauge the accuracy of counsel's figures. Also, the trial judge can 
make it clear that the suggestions are argumentative and can use 
his discretion to see that the jury does not go astray. An additional 
safeguard, as always, is the final review by the appellate courts. 
The holdings of the Minnesota and North Dakota courts 
indicate the confusion which exists with regard to the mathematical 
formula. The principal concern of both courts is the credulous 
jury, but they take opposite measures in attempting to solve tne 
problem. It might be argued that these approaches are not, in fact, 
inconsistent if one accepts the idea that only use by both counsel 
and jury is likely to lead to undesirable results. According to this 
view the problem could be corrected by eliminating use by either 
one or the other. Nevertheless, the basic approach should be as 
follows: If a formula approach is of use to counsel and if it can aid 
the jury in a given case, both should be permitted to use it unless 
possible dangers in its use outweigh the advantages. If the decision 
is that the dangers do outweigh the advantages, the mathematical 
approach should be banned across the board. It should not be 
23 King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961). 
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permitted on some limited basis in the hope that such limitation 
will stifle the feared abuses. 
B. The Total Amount Suggestion 
Prior to the problems raised by , the use of a mathematical 
formula the cases dealt only with whether counsel would be 
permitted to suggest a lump sum as an award for pain and suffering. 
As a result, in addition to distinguishing between use of a formula 
by counsel and use by the assessor of damages, some recent cases 
have also distinguished between mention by counsel of a per diem 
formula and mention of a total lump sum.24 However, most courts 
which permit the suggestion of a lump sum corresponding to pain 
and suffering also permit suggestion of a per diem figure. Several 
courts which recently have decided in favor of per diem formu-
lation have pointed to prior decisions in the state which permitted 
counsel to ask for some total figure, usually corresponding to the 
ad damnum clause in the complaint.25 Other courts have pointed 
to state statutes which provided for reading of the ad damnum 
clause to the jury.26 All of the recent decisions stress that it is 
illogical to prohibit a per diem suggestion if a total suggestion has 
already been approved. The feeling is that a per diem figure is 
no more speculative and no more apt to be misleading than a total 
damage figure or a total figure for pain and suffering. It would 
certainly seem that if the basic fear were of a credulous jury, a 
suggestion of any sum would cause damage regardless of its size and 
regardless of its incorporation into a formula. Indeed, the New 
Jersey court, in Botta v. Brunner21 has taken this stand. Prior to 
Botta, counsel could advise the jury of the amount sued for and 
state his opinion that the jury should award a stated sum short of 
this amount.28 The Botta court, in the course of prohibiting use 
24 Five dollars per day is an example of the former. $50,000 total for pain and suffer-
ing is an example of the latter. 
25 Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N.W.2d 209 (1961), 41 B.U.L. REv. 432; 
Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 
311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961); J. D. Wright&: Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1950). Some states which prohibit mention of a total figure have used 
this argument in reverse to prohibit mention of a per diem amount. See, e.g., Ratner v. 
Arrington, Ill So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
26 Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 
23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960). 
21 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). 
28 Rhodehouse v. Director Gen. of Railroads, 95 N.J.L. 355, Ill Atl. 662 (1920); Ku-
lodzej v. Lehigh V. R.R., 39 N.J. Super. 268, 120 A.2d 763 (App. Div. 1956). 
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of a formula by counsel, specifically overruled those opinions which 
had sanctioned these practices. On the other hand, the Wisconsin 
court, in Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Go.,29 banned 
the per diem formula suggestion but specified that counsel could 
make a suggestion of a lump sum amount for pain and 
suffering. Perhaps it can be said that a lump sum figure, if 
unreasonable, will so appear on its face; whereas a per diem figure 
might give the illusion of reasonableness while in fact leading to an 
unreasonable amount. Thus, a court might validly object to a 
per diem suggestion while approving a lump sum. Nevertheless, 
use of a per diem formula results ultimately in a total figure, the 
reasonableness of which should be just as apparent as where no 
formula is involved. Furthermore, the arguments actually ad-
vanced by the Affett court against the per diem suggestion apply 
equally to the suggestion of a lump sum. Once again there is 
evidence of confusion; and once again, the courts should make the 
basic decision whether a suggestion of a money amount aids or 
impedes the trial of a personal injury damage case. The decision 
should not depend upon the size of the figures suggested, nor upon 
whether they are suggested in conjunction with a formula. The 
jury's final determination will be of a total amount, and the effect 
of any suggestion upon this jury decision is all that really matters. 
II. BASIC AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT 
The most noticeable feature of recent judicial holdings and 
editorial comment has been the consistency with which both 
advocates and opponents of the formula approach have started from 
identical premises only to proceed to diametrically opposite con-
clusions. One gets the impression, however, that judges and 
commentators have likewise at times started with preconceived 
notions of whether the formula approach is a "good thing." 
Plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys clearly have a subjective 
interest in whether the formula approach is utilized; and conse-
quently their criticism of the opposite position at times becomes 
quite fanciful.30 In analyzing the arguments, one should keep in 
211 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960). 
so Compare the following commentary on the opinion in Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 
82, 1!18 A.2d 713 (1958), a leading decision prohibiting the formula approach: Botta is a 
lamentable decision which left the jury "wrapped in a Grand Banks fog." 23 NACCA 
L.J. 255, 257 (1959). "The decision is a masterpiece of sound thinking and judicial writ-
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mind the question whether a decision regarding the formula 
approach can be based on reasoned principles or whether it 
must, in the final analysis, be based on subjective interest or a 
preformed opinion. 
A. The Starting Point: Reasonable Compensation 
Since most authority on the formula approach is of current 
origin, attempts to draw on long-established case law have often 
resulted in inaccuracy because the sources were not relevant to 
the formula question.81 Nevertheless, one concept basic to the 
entire problem can be found in Pennsylvania decisions dating back 
to the nineteenth century. 
It was stated in Baker v. Pennsylvania Co.82 that the measure-
ment of damages was in the jury's sole domain and that the jury 
was to adopt the standard of a "reasonable allowance" in com-
pensating for pain and suffering.88 In that case, the court felt that 
the trial judge's instructions had given the jury the idea that what 
someone would charge to undergo voluntarily the suffering en-
dured by the plaintiff was relevant to their calculations. This was 
held to be erroneous on the ground that no one would voluntarily 
undergo such pain. Thus, the idea of "price" as a standard was 
senseless as there was no marketplace in which it could be 
determined.34 Five years later, the Pennsylvania court, in a similar 
case,3:;; once again stressed a distinction between "price" and 
"reasonable allowance."86 The court stated that the word "com-
pensation" means, not "price," but rather an "allowance looking 
towards recompense for, or made because of, the suffering con-
sequent upon the injury."37 Conceptually, this distinction is 
difficult to grasp, but a possible explanation is that a juror should 
think in broad terms of compensating the plaintiff for what he 
has already undergone and not in terms of what the juror would 
ing.'' 4 DEFENSE L.J. 288, 289 (1958). "The opinion is the most dangerous abridgement 
of the prerogative of counsel since Erskine defied the King of England." 24 NACCA L.J. 
252, 253 (1959). 
31 Notice, for example, the criticism of the court's reasoning in Botta v. Brunner, 
supra note 30, in 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 522 (1958). 
a2 142 Pa. 503, 21 Atl. 979 (1891). 
38 Id. at 511, 21 Atl. at 980. 
34 Id. at 510, 21 Atl. at 980. 
85 Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 177 Pa. 1, 35 Atl. 191 (1896). 
36 Id. at 15, 35 Atl. at 193. 
37 Ibid. 
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charge to undergo equivalent pain-the so-called "golden rule" 
test. Nevertheless, if the court was merely condemning use of the 
"golden rule," the broad language which it used has been inter-
preted beyond its intended scope.38 The appeal of this language to 
opponents of the formula appr:oach is obvious. They note that 
because it is the jury's sole province to consider the evidence and 
to arrive at a figure which will reasonably compensate the plaintiff, 
any suggestion at all by counsel is unnecessary and undesirable.39 
They also emphasize that the suggestion of a dollar a day, for 
example, smacks strongly of "price." It, therefore, is doubly im-
proper.40 Thus, the reasonable compensation principle has been 
said to prohibit any suggestion of an amount by counsel, especially 
the suggestion of a per diem figure. 
By the time of Herb v. Hallowell,41 decided in 1931, it became 
apparent that the Pennsylvania court was mired in distinctions 
which were more verbal than substantive. In this case, the jury was 
charged to award what the pain and suffering were "worth."42 
The court answered the argument that the idea of "worth" is 
objectionable because it places a price or money-equivalent on 
pain and suffering by countering that "price" or "money-equiva-
lent" is "rather close to what a plaintiff is seeking when he asks 
reasonable compensation for pain and suffering."43 This willing-
ness by the court to view the concepts of price and reasonable 
compensation as substantial equivalents would seem to sweep a 
portion of the ground from beneath the feet of those opponents 
of the formula approach who look to Pennsylvania for support. 
Although there remains the idea that only the jury can consider 
any amount, the "price" objection to a per diem figure, at least, is 
weakened. 
38 The Pennsylvania court, in a later case, did specifically castigate a request that 
the jury put a "separate yearly value" upon future pain and suffering as part of a for-
mula for reducing such amounts to their present worth. Bostwick v. Pittsburgh Rys., 
255 Pa. 387, 389, 100 Atl. 123, 124 (1917). 
so Chicago &: N.W. Ry. v. Candler, 283 F. 881 (8th Cir. 1922); Henne v. Balick, 51 
Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); King v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961); Affett v. Milwaukee &: Sub• 
urban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960); Seifert v. Los Angeles 
Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1961) (dissenting opinion-majority held 
point waived on appeal); Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 
2d 144 (1954) (dissenting opinion). 
40 See ibid. 
41 304 Pa. 128, 154 Atl. 582 (1931). 
42 Id. at 133, 154 Atl. at 584. 
43 Id. at 134, 154 Atl. at 584. 
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One result of this emphasis on reasonable compensation as 
measured by the jury alone, and the corresponding belief that no 
precise measurement of a pecuniary equivalent for pain and 
suffering is possible, was that Pennsylvania was the first state to 
prohibit counsel to use a per diem figure in conjunction with a 
formula approach.44 This rule seems difficult to justify on the 
above reasoning alone. A request for a certain sum per day for 
life, providing that it does not run afoul of the "golden rule" 
objection, could surely be considered by the jury in their quest 
for reasonable compensation. The jury decides other issues in a 
negligence case after hearing argument by counsel; the damage 
issue should not be an exception. The jury need not abandon the 
reasonableness standard because counsel has suggested a figure 
any more than it abandons the reasonable man standard because 
counsel maintains that the defendant acted in a certain way. A per 
diem suggestion should not stand in the way of a jury reasonably 
compensating a plaintiff, although perhaps there remains in the 
formula approach a hint of the "price" concept frowned upon by 
the Pennsylvania court. 
It is true that some courts outside of Pennsylvania have stressed 
"reasonable compensation" as one step toward a conclusion that 
counsel should be prohibited from using a formula.45 It is just as 
true, however, that other courts have given hearty assent to the 
reasonable compensation principle and have approved the formula 
approach as well.46 It is a basic tenet of those opposed to a formula 
approach that pain and suffering simply do not lend themselves 
to mathematical calculation47 and as a result there can be no "fixed 
44 See 41 B.U.L. REv. 432 (1961). Early decisions of the Third Circuit followed the 
strong Pennsylvania rule. E.g., Vaughan v. Magee, 218 Fed. 630 (3d Cir. 1914). Later de-
cisions pointed out that this was a matter of procedure and that with the repeal of the 
Conformity Act federal courts no longer had to follow the state court rule. Garrett v. 
Faust, 183 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1950); Smith v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 173 F.2d 721 (3d 
Cir. 1949). In a recent case, the Third Circuit upheld a suggestion by counsel in the 
district court that $2.77 per hour might be a reasonable figure. Bowers v. Pennsylvania 
R.R., 281 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1960), affirming per curiam 182 F. Supp. 756 (D. Del. 1960). 
Delaware prohibits use of the formula approach. Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 
394 (1958). 
45 Cases cited note 39 supra. 
46 Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956) 
(use of formula by district judge); Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957); 
Ratner v. Arrington, lll So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
47 Chicago &: N.W. Ry. v. Candler, 283 Fed. 881 (8th Cir. 1922); Gorczyca v. New 
York, N.H. &: H. Ry., 141 Conn. 701, 109 A.2d 589 (1954); Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 
146 A.2d 394 (1958); Certified T.V. &: Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 
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basis, table, standard, or mathematical rule which will serve as an 
accurate index and guide to the establishment of damage awards 
for personal injuries."48 But the courts which approve the formula 
see no incompatibility between counsel making a formula argu-
ment and the jury arriving at a reasonable allowance. Apparently, 
something more than this general principle has influenced those 
courts which have barred counsel from use of a formula approach. 
B. The Evidentiary Basis for Use of a Formula 
Probably the most repeated arguments against the use of a 
mathematical formula by counsel go to the evidentiary basis of 
the conversion of pain and suffering into a per diem figure!9 
First, it is usually charged that any figure which counsel supplies is 
mere speculation on his part.50 The courts which pursue this line 
of reasoning point to the subjective nature of pain and suffering, 
noting that it differs in individuals and differs from day to day in a 
single individual.51 Furthermore, they note that pain does not 
remain constant but will most likely decrease with the passage of 
time. One court has remarked: "Usually the jury is asked to 
use the worst hour or the worst day as a yardstick for evaluating 
pain."52 
In addition to the charge that any per diem figure is mere 
126 (1959); Roedder v. Rowley, 28 Cal. 2d 820, 172 P.2d 353 (1946) (dictum); Braddock 
v. Seaboard Airline R.R. Co., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955) (dictum); Green v. Rudsenske, 320 
S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (dictum). 
48 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 92-93, 138 A.2d 713, 718 (1958). 
40 Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 
138 A.2d 713 (1958); 43 MINN. L. REv. 832 (1959), 61 W. VA. L. REv. 302 (1959); King v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961); Harper v. Bolton, 124 S.E.2d 
54 (S.C. 1962); Certified T.V. &: Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 
(1959); Affett v. Milwaukee &: Suburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 
(1960); Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1961) (dis-
senting opinion-majority held point waived on appeal). One writer has pointed out 
the conflicting values involved: the right of counsel to argue his case fully and the right 
of defendant to keep the argument limited to the evidence. D'Alemberte, The Per Diem 
Approach to Damages for Pain and Suffering, 14 FLA. L. REv. 189 (1961). Another has 
said the critical concept is the distinction between legitimate argument based on evidence 
versus opinions of counsel not based on evidence. 61 W. VA. L. REv. 302 (1959). 
ISO Ibid. 
ISl Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 
138 A.2d 713 (1958); Herb v. Hallowell, 304 Pa. 128, 154 At!. 582 (1931); Certified T.V. 
&: Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959). See Miller, Assessment 
of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 14 MINN. L. REv. 216 (1930); Plant, Damages for 
Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200 (1958). 
r;2 Hallada v. Great No. Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 99, 69 N.W. 2d 673, 687, cert. denied, 350 
U.S. 874 (1955). 
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speculation, opponents of the per diem approach sometimes view 
any suggestion by counsel as an introduction of evidence rather 
than an inference from evidence already before the court.cs3 This 
means that counsel is giving testimony154 by suggesting figures and 
vouching for their reasonableness, and this is something which not 
even an expert witness would be allowed to do.155 Thus, it is 
maintained, counsel is circumventing established rules of proce-
dure.156 
Those courts which permit the use of a formula are in complete 
agreement that any suggestion by counsel must be founded in the 
evidence. They argue, however, that any per diem figure is 
necessarily based upon whatever evidence of pain and suffering 
has been introduced and, thus, such a figure is neither mere 
conjecture57 nor the introduction of evidence not already before 
the court.58 While they agree that people are indeed affected 
differently by pain and suffering, they stress that this is a reason 
why counsel ought to have the opportunity to present the case with 
respect to the specific plaintiff involved.159 In this connec-
tion, it is pointed out that the suggestions have ranged from 
53 Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958). 
54 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); King v. Railway Express Agency, 
Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961); Certified T.V. &: Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 
109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959). 
55 Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Botta v. Brunner, supra note 54; 
Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954) (dissenting 
opinion). 
56 Henne v. Balick, supra note 55; see 61 W. VA. L. REv. 302 (1959). Contra, Caley v. 
Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961). 
57 Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956) 
(use of formula by federal judge); Bowers v. Pennsylvania R.R., 182 F. Supp. 756 (D. 
Del.), afj'd per curiam, 281 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1960); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 
2d 144 (1954); Texas&: N.O.R.R. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). One 
writer has remarked, "Those who contend that there can be no reasonable relation 
between pain and suffering and any mathematical computation are unconvincing in a 
society where people are constantly choosing between bearing pain or spending more 
to assuage it." 41 B.U.L. REv. 432, 435 (1961). 
58 Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961); Louisville&: N.R.R. v. 
Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960); Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957); 
Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); Texas&: N.O.R.R. v. Flowers, supra 
note 57; Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960); 
Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960). In addition to stressing that counsel 
is not introducing evidence, these cases stress the duty and practice of trial judges in 
pointing out this fact to the jury. 
59 See, e.g., Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W .2d 637 (1944) (total figure 
suggested); Arnold v. Ellis, supra note 58. It has been suggested that the jury can be 
reminded that pain and suffering will diminish, and can be advised to apply declining 
or average rate. 43 MINN. L. REv. 832 (1959). 
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fifty cents per day to five hundred dollars per day.60 Clearly, the 
jury's verdict must be based on the evidence which has been 
offered; and, on the damage issue, this verdict will be a dollar 
amount. The argument is that, if the jury can infer a dollar 
equivalent from the evidence before it, counsel should be able to 
do the same.61 In the recent case of Yates v. Wenk,62 the Michigan 
court maintained: "The same speculative quality which exists 
in a lawyer's estimate of money value of a day's pain and suffering 
exists likewise in plaintiff's ad damnum clause and in the jury 
verdict to the extent they allow for pain and suffering."63 
The line between speculation and legitimate inference from the 
evidence, at least with reference to mathematical formulae, is 
conceptually difficult to draw. It is true that a per diem figure is 
not inferred from the evidence in the same way as are hospital 
costs, nurses' fees, lost wages and the other elements of recovery for 
personal injury. It must be remembered, however, that pain and 
suffering, by their very nature, cannot be measured with precision. 
Nevertheless, an award for this element of damages is a part of 
compensating the plaintiff, indeed a very important part. And the 
same obstacles which face the jury in arriving at a figure also face 
counsel. Although some writers have suggested that the assessment 
of pain and suffering damages be removed from the province of 
the jury,64 this is not yet the case; nor is it probable that it soon 
oo Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954) ($5.00 
per day); Texas &: N.O.R.R. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (.$500.00 
per day). 
61 "Since the jury itself must arrive at a specific figure we see no logical reason why 
counsel shall not be permitted to speak in terms of specific figures." Louisville &: N .R.R. 
v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155, 161 (Ky. 1960). "But the fact of pain and suffering is 
recompensed in dollars. If this is so, it does thereby furnish a basis for argument, qua 
argument, that pain and suffering have a monetary value." Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 
2d 323, 335, 173 N.E.2d 209, 214 (1961). One review specifically criticizes the logic of the 
Botta decision on this point. 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 522 (1958). Accord, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 780 
(1958); 28 U. CINC. L. R.Ev. 138 (1959). 
62 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961). 
63 Id. at 318, 109 N.W.2d at 831. 
64 GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS-TORT LAW AND INSURANCE 88 (1958) would have "loss 
insurance" on automobiles which would afford compensation without reference to fault, 
but exclude any recovery for pain and suffering. Professor James questions the justice 
of pain and suffering awards whenever an insurer is held liable without proof of miscon-
duct. James, Some Reflections on the Basis of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REv. 293 (1958). 
Professor Kalven refers to Professor Jaffe's "heroic thesis" that it is unsound to recognize 
pain and suffering as a head of damages, in The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury 
Damage Award, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 158 (1958). It has been suggested that pain and suffering 
which does not result in economic loss should not be compensated, Morris, Liability for 
Pain and Suffering, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 476 (1959); and that a claimant's pain and suffering 
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will be. As long as there is evidence of pain and suffering and an 
award for these elements is forthcoming, argument by counsel on 
such an important part of plaintiff's claim should not be prohibited 
solely on the ground suggested above. Since the question of 
damages may well be the issue in the case, it seems unwise to place 
this topic beyond the scope of legitimate advocacy for any but the 
most convincing reasons. 65 
Perhaps, in the final analysis, strict adherence to a basis in the 
evidence requirement would result in a prohibition on the use by 
counsel of a formula approach to damages. A figure of two dollars 
per day cannot really be inferred from evidence of pain and 
suffering. The arguments favoring such a strict adherence, how-
ever, are not compelling; and, as with the reasonable compensation 
principle, the courts which have prohibited per diem argument 
have not been content to rest on this ground alone. Rather, both 
principles have been used by the courts to bolster decisions which 
probably are not founded upon a consideration of fundamental 
principles at all, but upon a fear of what the opposite holding 
would bring. Put most plainly, this is the fear of the effect which a 
formula approach by counsel might have on the average jury. 
It seems that the presence or absence of this fear has determined 
the holdings of most courts which have ruled on the per diem 
issue.66 
award be held to 50% of his medical expenses, Plant, supra note 51; while another 
writer has proposed legislation resembling the workmen's compensation statutes, Zeler• 
myer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REv. 27 (1954). 
65 The argument is sometimes made that use by counsel for plaintiff of a formula 
approach places counsel for defendant in a precarious position. On the one hand, he 
must answer with an argument likewise having no foundation in the evidence or suffer 
the full effects of plaintiff's argument on the jury. On the other hand, by answering, de-
fendant implies approval of the formula approach. Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, lll8 
A.2d 713 (1958); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). It is main• 
tained further that this places defendant in an "unjustifiable dilemma" because it forces 
him to argue the issue of damages. See Caley v. Manicke, 29 III. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E. 2d 
209 (1961). If, however, damages are a crucial issue, it would seem that both parties 
should be heard on this subject. An argument by defendant in mitigation of damages 
could be made without tacitly approving a formula approach to the question and without 
admitting liability. The Caley court noted that counsel have been doing this for years 
and that use by counsel for plaintiff of a formula approach renders it no less feasible. 
29 III. App. 2d at 337, 173 N.E.2d at 215. It has also been noted that an argument on 
the damage issue can actually prove to be a tactical advantage to the defendant and that, 
furthermore, defense counsel have despaired too readily of their potential for arguing 
damage points with vigor. Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961); Kalven, 
supra note 64; 41 B.U.L. REv. 432 (1961); 43 MINN. L. REv. 832 (1959); 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 
780 (1958); 12 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 522 (1958). 
66 See D'Alemberte, The Per Diem Approach to Damages for Pain and Suffering, 14 
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C. The Fear of the Credulous Jury 
One, indeed, gets the impression from the opinions that, over-
riding both of the above principles, there stands a feeling on the 
part of the courts, either born of personal experience or implanted 
by a forceful argument of the defendant, that the main purpose 
and effect of a per diem argument are to lead the jury to base its 
verdict on something other than the evidence presented or to 
measure it by some standard other than reasonable compensation. 
As to the former, it is said that a per diem suggestion starts the 
jurors thinking of amounts which are completely out of proportion 
to those to which a careful consideration of the evidence would 
lead.il7 The argument is that the jury ceases to be concerned with 
the plaintiff's injury and starts thinking solely in terms of dollars 
and cents. Alternatively, there is the belief that once a formula is 
suggested the standard of reasonableness is forgotten and the jury 
neglects to consider the reasonableness of the total figure to which 
the application of the formula leads. 68 What makes this particularly 
objectionable is that in both cases there is a conviction that the 
very reason for counsel using a formula is to mislead the jury.00 
These fears often lead to a statement that a formula argument 
is an invasion of the province of the jury.70 If by the jury's 
province is meant that it is the jury's function to arrive at a 
damage figure for pain and suffering, this province is invaded only 
if the jury itself abandons its appointed function and accepts with-
out question the suggestions of counsel. This, then, is really no 
more than the fear itself put into other words. It would appear that 
the anti-formula courts have been convinced that the use of a per 
diem approach leads to higher verdicts than those returned when 
FLA. L. REv. 189 (1961). The writer feels that the source of the dichotomy in this area 
is a pull between confidence in the judgment of jurors and a fear of the psychological 
impact of a formula argument on jurors. 
67 Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Hallada v. Great No. Ry., 244 
Minn. 81, 69 N.W .2d 673 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 874 (1955); Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, 
St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 
138 A.2d 713 (1958); King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961). 
68 See Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 
274 (1960); 43 MINN, L. REv. 832 (1959). 
oo Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 
138 A.2d 713 (1958), 4 DEFENSE L.J. 288; Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 
supra note 68; Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1961) 
(dissenting opinion-majority held point waived on appeal). 
70 King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961); Certified T.V. 
& Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959). 
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this approach is prohibited and, moreover, that such an approach 
leads to excessive,71 even "monstrous," verdicts.72 
The verdicts in several of the reported cases lend support to 
certain of the above arguments. The Florida court has upheld a 
verdict for 248,439 dollars which coincided with the aggregate 
of the demands made by counsel for the plaintiff.73 In a recent 
California case, counsel's estimates were followed exactly and re-
sulted in a verdict for 187,903 dollars.74 There are other examples 
of similar correlation, in which it appears that the jury has 
clearly followed the lead of counsel.75 As will be discussed below, 
however, these amounts, though suggested by counsel, could still 
be based on the evidence and could still be put to the test of 
overall reasonableness. Surely a verdict should not be reversed 
simply because it is what counsel demands and, furthermore, 
there are countless cases in which the jury did not follow the 
suggestion of counsel and returned a verdict far below the amount 
suggested.76 And as for the mere size of the verdicts, there are 
many examples of "monstrous" verdicts where no formula at all 
was in the picture.77 
Proponents of the formula approach, of course, do not share 
the fear of excessive verdicts-higher verdicts may, indeed, result 
from the use of a formula but not excessive or "horrendous" ver-
dicts. 73 It is maintained that to allow the jurors by themselves to 
71 Two writers are convinced that breaking figures down into a per diem amount 
leads to higher verdicts. Kalven, supra note 64, at 161-62; Morris, supra note 64, at 480. 
See D'Alemberte, supra note 66; 4 DEFENSE L.J. 181 (1958); 43 MINN. L. R.Ev. 832 (1959); 
19 Omo ST. L.J. 780 (1958). 
72 Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M.R.R., 244 Minn. I, 29, 68 N.W.2d 873, 
891 (1955). 
73 Braddock v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955), afj'd on rehearing, 
96 So. 2d 127, ce,·t. denied, 355 U.S. 892 (1957). The Missouri court has noted this case 
as an example of what can happen when a formula approach is used. Faught v. Washam, 
329 S.W .2d 588 (Mo. 1959). 
74 Seifert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, Inc., 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1961). 
75 E.g., Gardner v. State Taxi, Inc., 336 Mass. 28, 142 N.E.2d 586 (1957). 
76 E.g., Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957). In this case $57,860 was 
suggested as compensation for pain and suffering alone. The jury returned a verdict of 
$15,000. In another case, the court remarked that the jury could not have followed the 
computations of counsel since their verdict was less than one-half the minimum recovery 
sought through the mathematics of counsel. Kimbell v. Noel, 228 S.W .2d 980 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1950). 
77 E.g., Darnold v. Voges, 143 Cal. App. 2d 230, 300 P .2d 255 (1956); Loftin v. Wilson, 
67 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1953). See Plant, supra note 51. Professor Plant believes that the 
present system leads to overcompensation whether a formula is employed or not. 
78 Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961). 
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arrive at some reasonable figure is to resort to a "by guess and by 
golly" approach.79 The jury is said to need guidance in reaching 
a determination,80 and the very absence of a definite yardstick is 
said to make the per diem approach desirable.81 In addition, great 
emphasis is put on the discretion of the trial judge and his ability 
to limit per diem argument if it is leading to prejudice.82 The pro-
ponents are convinced that juries are not so easily swayed by ad-
vocacy as the opponents of the formula approach seem to believe 
and that juries do not expect the degree of restraint on the part of 
counsel which the opponents would impose.83 An argument is 
made that it is silly to forbid counsel to use a formula because the 
jury might very well adopt this method on its own and no one 
would be the wiser.84 In summary, it is stressed that because a 
formula approach is more persuasive is no reason to prohibit it.85 
Professor Kalven, in his studies of the workings of the jury 
system, has become convinced that the jury's quest is more for an 
appropriate single sum than for a summation of specific compo-
nents. 86 This would mean that the average jury probably does not 
give separate dollar consideration to an item labeled pain and suf-
fering, and it certainly means that it normally does not think of 
such damages on a day-by-day basis. It is part of Professor Kalven's 
thesis that because a jury thinks in terms of total sum it is less 
responsive to pain and suffering than is commonly supposed, and 
79 Texas&: N.O.R.R. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). See Imperial 
Oil, Ltd. v. Drill<, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956); Continental Bus 
Sys., Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W .2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). 
80 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Caley v. Manicke, 29 
Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 
(1961); Texas &: N.O.R.R. v. Flowers, supra note 79; 43 MINN. L. REv. 832 (1959); 12 
RUTGERS L. REv. 522 (1958). 
81 Ratner v. Arrington, supra note 80; Caley v. Manicke, supra note 80; 12 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 522 (1958). 
82 Pennsylvania R.R. v. McKinley, 288 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1961); Braddock v. Seaboard 
Airline R.R., 80 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1955), affd on rehearing, 96 So. 2d 127, cert. denied, 355 
U.S. 892 (1957); Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960); Yates v. 
Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961); Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 
754 (1959); Continental Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W .2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1959); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960). 
ss Yates v. Wenk, supra note 82; Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. Toombs, supra note 82; 
A.B.C. Storage &: Moving Co. v. Herron, 138 S.W .2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (total figure 
suggested). 
84 Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W .2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); 43 
MINN. L. REv. 832 (1959). 
85 Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill • .App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961). 
88 Kalven, supra note 64. 
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that, as a result, a change in the law to deny such damages would 
not have a significant effect on verdicts. 87 In any given case, how-
ever, a certain part of the damages are subject to definite proof 
and cannot very well be ignored by the jury. It is the amount for 
pain and suffering, along with amounts for future lost income 
and future medical expenses, which are the speculative portions 
of the award, and often determine the gross size of the final award. 
In many cases, in fact, the award for these elements will 
comprise fifty percent or more of the total figure. Even if a juror 
is thinking only of a single lump sum, it would seem that the 
size of this sum depends to a great extent upon the variables which 
it involves, particularly, the pain and suffering award. Consci-
ously or not, the jury still measures and grants an award for pain 
and suffering. 
Counsel's use of a per diem formula should depend upon 
whether a formula might be of use to the jury in this process and 
whether its advantages outweigh the dangers pointed out by the 
opponents of the formula approach.88 It can certainly be argued 
that the average juror is more familiar with compensation for serv-
ices at so much per hour or per day than with large lump sums. 
It would seem reasonable to permit the suggestion of using a sim-
ilar standard when compensating for pain and suffering. As men-
tioned above, there exists much discretion in the trial judge on 
the issue of damages. This faith in him should extend to a confi-
dence that he will not allow the formula approach to be misused. 
There remains also the control exercised by the appellate courts.89 
These courts ordinarily hesitate to upset a verdict, but they will 
do so if it is so excessive as to shock the conscience.00 All in all, 
if a formula in some instances can be an aid to the jury, and if in 
most instances it is an aid to counsel, there seem to be adequate 
means to prevent its misuse; and the fears of its opponents do not 
seem to justify its prohibition. 
87 Id. at 170. 
88 See Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Corbett, 177 A.2d 701 (Md. 1962). The court 
used a balancing approach and decided that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. 
89 An example of such control is offered by a Texas case. The Texas courts have 
generally permitted the use of formulae, but the court of civil appeals struck down coun• 
sel's efforts in one case where it was shown that his calculations were made before the case 
began and set forth factual matters not supported by the evidence. Wanen Petroleum 
Corp. v. Pyeatt, 275 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). 
90 Hall v. Booth, 178 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961). The judge disapproved of the 
formula argument but decided that the jury had not been misled and sustained the 
verdict. 
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III. THE PRESENT w ORTH PUZZLE 
Once counsel and jury are permitted to use a formula approach 
to compensating for pain and suffering, there arises a further ques-
tion. Assume that, in light of the evidence presented, five dollars 
per day is found to be a reasonable allowance. Assume further 
that, upon measurement of plaintiff's life expectancy, there would 
result an award for pain and suffering of fifty thousand dollars. It 
has been the general rule that pain and suffering awards are not 
discounted, with the entire sum being awarded to plaintiff. With 
the advent of the formula approach, however, the question is pre-
sented whether damages for future pain and suffering should be 
discounted to their present worth. 
If no formula is in the picture, there seems to be an assumption 
that the jury, consciously or unconsciously, takes into account the 
fact that the plaintiff will receive the present-use value of the 
amount they award. Because the award can be invested to produce 
further sums for the plaintiff, the initial award need not be so 
great. There is, then, no need for further reduction. 
It is more difficult to say, however, that such an implicit dis-
counting takes place when a per diem formula is used. This is 
especially true if an award such as that assumed above is regarded 
as an allocation to plaintiff of five dollars for each successive day's 
pain and suffering. There would clearly appear to be overcompen-
sation if a present award is made to plaintiff of the five dollars in-
tended to compensate him for his last day's pain and suffering. 
Defendant might well demand that the fifty thousand dollars be 
reduced to present worth. 
This conclusion might possibly be avoided if it is emphasized 
that the formula approach is merely a convenient tool of analysis. 
On this theory, the jury is not viewed as saying that plaintiff is 
to get exactly five dollars per day for the rest of his life. Pain 
and suffering damages are not an amount measurable with preci-
sion which plaintiff would have received had he not been injured. 
Thus, the five dollars can be viewed simply as a guide, with fifty 
thousand dollars being the important figure. 
It is, however, hard to dispel the notion that if five dollars is 
reasonable compensation for a day's pain, it is unfair for plaintiff, 
in fact, to receive more than this amount. The use of the formula 
approach, it seems, presents a problem that is, both practically and 
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theoretically, a very difficult one. Nevertheless, the conclusion 
seems inescapable that a per diem approach does_ not permit the 
assumption that there has been an implicit discounting. The five 
dollars is regarded as reasonable compensation for the pain and 
suffering which plaintiff will undergo on the present day or any 
succeeding day. It is unlikely that a jury picks five dollars instead 
of six dollars because they reason that the plaintiff will have the 
use value of the five dollars which is allocated for succeeding days. 
Therefore, if no reduction can be implied, it would appear that 
the total arrived at by the use of a formula should be reduced to 
its present worth, thus bringing it into line with the figure that 
would be reached without the use of a formula. Perhaps this as-
sumes precision in an area where it is agreed none can exist, but 
if an award is to be based on future pain and suffering by using 
a formula approach, that award should be discounted in the same 
manner as an award for future loss of income. 
IV. SUMMARY 
An award for pain and suffering will be a part of almost every 
personal injury case in which plaintiff wins a verdict. While pain 
and suffering are impossible to measure with any exactness, the 
jury, as our system now stands, must arrive at some figure which 
will represent these elements of the plaintiff's claim. Furthermore, 
because damages in general, and those for pain and suffering in 
particular, are so important to both plaintiff and defendant, it 
would appear that both should be allowed wide latitude in making 
their arguments on this point. When it comes to pain and suffer-
ing, counsel for plaintiff, like the jury, often needs help in making 
a tangible argument with reference to these intangible elements. 
A formula approach is clearly a great help-to him. It could also 
be of help to a jury which is accustomed to think of compensation 
in terms of hourly or daily rates. Counsel should be able to argue 
amounts and should have the aid of formulae unless these are 
clearly prohibited by established legal principles or are clearly 
counter to sound policy considerations. Neither the reasonable 
compensation principle nor the demand that argument be based 
upon the evidence and not be mere speculation by counsel seem 
to require prohibition of a formula. It is possible to reconcile use 
of a formula with both principles. The risks of misuse and ulti-
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mate adverse effect on the jury are problems of the type which 
trial judges, and eventually the appellate courts, are asked to con-
trol every day. Th D H k · S Ed omas . ee in, . . 
